We study the long-run effects of conflict on social attitudes, with World War II in Central and Eastern Europe as our setting. Much of earlier work has relied on selfreported measures of victimization, which are prone to endogenous misreporting. With our own survey-based measure, we replicate established findings linking victimization to political participation, civic engagement, optimism, and trust. Those findings are reversed, however, when tested instead with an objective measure of victimization based on historical reference material. Thus, we urge caution when interpreting surveybased results from this literature as causal.
Introduction
In recent years researchers have paid considerable attention to the impact of conflict on social attitudes. Bauer et al. (2016) have conducted an influential meta-analysis of this body of work in which 17 sets of results are combined to examine the impact of war on social behaviors (including civic engagement, political participation, and trust). War is generally found to subsequently improve indicators of prosociality, except in the case of trust. Conflict has been reported to positively affect political and civic engagement (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; Cassar et al. 2013; De Luca and Verpoorten 2015a; Gilligan et al. 2014; Grosjean 2014) , while negatively affecting trust (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2014; Cassar et al. 2013; De Juan and Pierskalla 2016; Grosjean 2014; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Rohner et al. 2013 ) and optimism (Bozzoli et al. 2011) .
1 But much of this literature has relied upon retrospective survey-based (subjectively reported) conflict victimization data. This is particularly true of work examining civic and political engagement (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; Cassar et al. 2013; Grosjean 2014; Voors et al. 2012) . By contrast, objective measures of victimization have typically been used in work examining trust and optimism.
While most studies have argued at length that violence is not selected on the basis of social outcomes, none have discussed the possibility that measurement error in the retrospective victimization measure is selected on that basis. We draw from well-established research in psychology to explore the possibility that recall bias can explain common findings in the conflict literature. The resulting mechanism is simple and intuitive. The following types of individuals may be more likely to perceive, remember, or exaggerate exposure to conflict:
the civicly engaged; (ii) the politically engaged; (iii) the less trusting; and (iv) the pessimistic.
Under such circumstances, measurement error would be correlated with any (or all) of the traits (i)-(iv), and results based on cross-sectional survey data would be consequently biased.
1 De Luca and Verpoorten (2015b) suggest that conflict negatively affects trust and civic engagement.
2 See Neugebauer and Ng (1990) for a general discussion.
2 Attitude-based measurement error Hardt and Rutter (2004) present a meta-analysis of studies evaluating the validity of retrospective accounts of adverse childhood experiences. They find that the literature reports substantial measurement error associated with those subjective measures of victimization, and that the error is nonrandom with respect to individual characteristics in some settings (e.g. gender in Widom and Courtois (1997) ; mental health in Robins et al. (1985) ). In other work, recall accuracy of childhood psychiatric diagnoses is found to be influenced by gender (Fendrich et al. 1990; Masia et al. 2003) , and by the psychiatric health of parents (Fendrich et al. 1990) . In yet another strand of research, the personality of subjects themselves is found to impose a directional bias on the nature of their selected memories (Bradley and Mogg 1994; Brewin et al. 1993; Matt et al. 1992 ). In our application, this could imply those with negative outlooks (i.e. those with political grievances, pessimism, or low trust) selectively recall negative experiences such as conflict victimization. The meta-analysis of Hardt and Rutter (2004) finds that significant associations between retrospectively reported adverse experiences and later outcomes (such as depression, pain, and poor social functioning) degenerate once official reports of those experiences are analyzed instead. Our paper presents analogous findings for the literature linking conflict to social attitudes. Hardt and Rutter (2004) note that bias in retrospective measures of abuse (victimization) is particularly pronounced when recall relies heavily on judgment or interpretation. This has generally been true for the conflict literature addressed in this paper. Blattman (2009) uses a survey-based measure of abduction in which, for instance, an individual being forcefully stopped by a rebel group to provide directions also qualifies as abduction. Many of the effects of victimization in Blattman (2009) appear driven by violent acts witnessed (rather than perpetrated or received), which can be interpreted relatively loosely. Bellows and Miguel (2009) consider victimization as whether any household members were injured or 5 turned into refugees during the conflict. Not only might the terms 'injury' or 'refugee' be interpreted idiosyncratically, but the authors themselves suggest that respondents adopt a wide understanding of the term 'household', to include extended family members as well.
The same critique would apply to Cassar et al. (2013) who also refer to injury of household members in their survey-based determination of victimization. Voors et al. (2012) count nonphysical violence towards any household member (including theft, forced labor, etc.) in their survey-based measure, which may also permit a liberal interpretation of what constitutes victimization.
In light of the insights gleaned from psychology, we argue a greater scope for interpretation of survey questions opens the possibility for selective recall bias in the associated measure of victimization. This brings into question earlier findings, since measurement error is then nonrandom with respect to correlates of the outcome. The use of self-reported victimization data need not be problematic if recall bias were purely a function of observable characteristics for which the researcher can control. In our application of interest, the source of confound may closely relate to the outcome of interest, however, in that both can be attitudinal factors.
As such, this complication merits empirical exploration. expenses. All other modules were answered by a randomly drawn adult from the household with no substitutions possible, using a minimum of three repeat visits if an interview could not be conducted.
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For comparability with prior work, we gather relevant questions from the LiTS and classify them into four broad categories. We measure 'political participation' with three variables: (i) Protest: an index capturing whether the respondent would attend a lawful demonstration, participate in a strike, or sign a petition, on a scale of 1 (would never do) to 3 (have done); (ii) Member party: a dummy for whether the respondent is a member of a political party; and (iii) Voting: an indicator capturing whether the respondent voted in the last (national, local or presidential) election. 'Civic engagement' is measured by (i) Social capital : an index capturing the number of voluntary organizations of which the respondent is a member, ranging from 0 to 8; and (ii) Friends: the frequency with which the respondent meets up with friends on a scale of 1 (less than once a month) to 5 (on most days). 'Optimism' is operationalized as a measure of (i) Life satisfaction: how satisfied the respondent is with his/her life, on a scale of 1 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied); and (ii) Effort: a dummy for whether the respondent believes that effort and hard work, or intelligence and skills (as opposed to political connections or breaking the law) are important for success. We use two variables to capture 'trust': (i) Trust people: the extent to which the respondent believes that people can be trusted, on a scale of 1 (complete distrust)
to 5 (complete trust); and (ii) Trust institutions: an index capturing the extent to which the respondent trusts a variety of institutions, such as parliament, police, banks, and the financial system, on a scale of 1 to 5.
Independent variables
Subjective conflict measure Our subjective conflict measure, WW2 (subj), is drawn from the LiTS. It is a dummy indicating whether the respondent, or any of his/her parents or grandparents, were physically injured or killed during the Second World War. On average, around 34.6% of respondents in our data set recalled direct victimization or victimization at the family level. It is notable that the average survey respondent was born approximately 17 years after the end of WW2. As such, the effects we measure here are essentially intergenerational, and might therefore be considered diluted on that basis. However, other studies have detected long-term effects of conflict on social attitudes (e.g. Besley and
Reynal-Querol (2014); Cassar et al. (2013) ; Grosjean (2014); Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) ).
Moreover, Bauer et al. (2016) contend that "the impacts of exposure do not diminish with time; indeed, if anything, the opposite seems to be true" (p. 250).
Objective conflict measure Our objective data on conflict during World War II are compiled at the PSU level and come from the historical volume of Ellis (1993 We project each map from Ellis (1993) onto a data set consisting of geo-coded spatial markers for the LiTS PSUs. We then establish a buffer zone with a 15-km radius around each PSU to ascertain whether it was exposed to any type of fighting. As a first step, we are thus able to compute a binary measure of exposure to WW2 conflict. We then weigh this measure to reflect the number of individual incidents to which each PSU was exposed. As such, our objective conflict measure is a count variable reflecting the sum of various attacks and defensive operations incurred by a PSU (including counterattacks, encirclements, and failed attacks).
5
The average PSU experienced 0.534 events (with a maximum of 6 and a standard devi-5 Here we implicitly impose homogeneous effect sizes across various forms of violence. Hoddie and Smith (2009) suggest violence heterogeneity can be important when examining effects on trust. ation of 0.984). For robustness, we recalculate our indicator for violence exposure by using instead a 30-km and 45-km radius.
6 To our knowledge, the resulting dataset constitutes the most accurate and comprehensive data on WW2 conflict based on an objective measure.
7 Figure 2 presents the geographic distribution of our objective conflict measure across PSUs.
Since our identification strategy relies on variation within sub-national regions, we drop countries in which insufficient variation is present (mostly located in the Western USSR).
The countries included in our final sample are thus: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
Other variables Drawing on the LiTS data, we control for a variety of additional respondentlevel and family-level characteristics which may be correlated with both conflict targeting, reporting, and attitudes. Demographics are captured by age, marriage (dummy), gender (male dummy), and self-reported health status (on an increasing scale from -5 to -1). Socioeconomic status is captured by employment (dummy), a variable measuring self-reported income (on a scale of 1-10), and secondary/university education (dummy). Parental background is proxied by controls for the full-time years of the respondent's father's and mother's education, and whether the respondent or any members of his/her family were members of the communist party. To reduce confounding effects from selective migration, we include:
(i) a dummy for whether the respondent has ever moved (moved (ever)); and (ii) a dummy capturing whether the respondent, or any of his/her parents or grandparents were forced to move during the Second World War (moved (WW2)).
To alleviate location-based confound, we also include dummies for sub-national adminis-trative regions and controls for latitude, longitude, and whether the respondent resides in an urban locality. We obtain data on PSU latitude and longitude from Nikolova and Simroth (2015) . Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1 .
4 Conceptual framework
It is instructive to begin by comparing the congruency of our objective and subjective measures of violence. In order to do so, we aggregate our self-reported measure to the PSU level.
24.1% of the variation in self-reported victimization is explained by PSU residence (30% for those with no history of migration). Across PSUs, the correlation between the objective and subjective alternatives is just 0.113 (yet highly significant). Recalculating the PSU average for the subjective measure by excluding those with observable migration histories does not meaningfully change this correlation. Granted, our two variables are not exactly equivalent in that one measures the incidence of violence, and the other victimization. Still, so long as violence implies victimization, the measures should be highly correlated in the absence of significant error. Bellows and Miguel (2009) report an analogous correlation of 0.3 between objective and subjective measures, without offering elaboration. But we contend the misalignment between these measures is extremely important for inference since it can derive from non-random bias in the retrospective measure.
Our particular subjective measure of victimization (also used by Grosjean (2014) We first focus on specifications using the self-reported measure of exposure to conflict.
In order to do so, we adopt the following estimation model:
Here the attitudinal outcome Y of individual i in PSU p of sub-national region r is taken to depend on a region-specific effect α r , a vector of individual characteristics X ipr , selfreported exposure to conflict C s ipr , and idiosyncratic error ipr . Standard errors are clustered at the level of sub-national regions, and survey weights, which ensure that the data are representative at the country level, are included in all specifications.
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The coefficient of interest is β 1 , which has typically been interpreted as the impact of conflict on attitudes, conditional on conflict incidence not being selected on the basis of the outcomes Y , or individual characteristics correlated with those outcomes and not captured in X ipr . But this identifying assumption overlooks the possibility that self-reported exposure to conflict may not sufficiently reflect actual exposure to conflict. Insofar as the reporting error for conflict is correlated with the outcome Y , or some correlates of Y , then we are still left with an endogeneity issue in model 1. In order to address this potential problem, which has not been discussed in previous work on conflict, we introduce a second model:
The above model addresses our endogeneity problem because conflict in (2) -C o pr -is no longer self-reported, but rather objectively measured using third-party (historical) reference material. Of course, we are still left with the possibility that actual violence is targeted at areas in which certain social attitudes prevail -the typical identification challenge cited for model (1), and addressed in part by including sub-national regional effects. We therefore interpret β 2 as an improved estimate of the impact of conflict on attitudinal outcomes, net of selection effects related to (deliberate or accidental) recall bias suffered by the estimate β 1 .
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Results
Prior to estimating the full models of equations 1 and 2 above, we begin the analysis with more parsimonious specifications. From models 1 and 2 we drop the control vector X ipr , to calculate our key bivariate correlations allowing for region-specific intercepts. We first test the correlation between conflict and political/civic engagement using our subjective measure of victimization. Columns 1-3 of Table 2 (Table   3) , the relationships between victimization and political/civic engagement are essentially reversed. The data now suggest those exposed to violence are less likely to protest, join political parties, or meet with friends.
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We next introduce the control vector X ipr into model 1, to assess whether observable characteristics can account for 'bias' in β 1 . Indeed, when conditioning on individual characteristics in Table 4 , the coefficient estimates of β 1 drop in magnitude in columns 1-3. This is consistent with observable traits driving both political participation and positive recall of victimization. Reassuringly, covariates such as health, employment, and education are mostly positively associated with political and civic engagement, and the corresponding point estimates are often large and stable across models (for a given outcome variable). In Table 5 we estimate model 2 with individual controls included. When doing so, the point estimates of the impact of conflict remain comparatively stable, although some precision is lost. With or without controls, there is little indication that objective conflict strengthens political or civic engagement. If anything, the relationship appears to run in the opposite direction. Together we interpret tables 2-5 as evidence of positive bias in β 1 , stemming from selective misreporting among the politically and civicly (dis)engaged. We therefore extend caution towards the interpretation of earlier findings linking political/civic engagement to conflict based entirely on self-reported victimization data.
We next explore the impact of conflict on our measures of optimism. We again present bivariate results first, followed by the full model. In Table 6 , we find a negative effect of subjective victimization on optimism. From our methodological perspective, we interpret this as evidence that pessimistic individuals are more likely to report that their families had been victimized. Interestingly, when we instead use the objective measure of conflict in columns 1-2 of Table 7 , the relationship is reversed. Those locations in which conflict was more severe are characterized by greater optimism among inhabitants. This finding adds to evidence suggesting that conflict reduces optimism in the short-run, but not necessarily in the medium-run (Bozzoli et al. 2011) . The reversal of the relation between conflict and optimism when moving from subjective to objective indicators may constitute further evidence that self-reported victimization is subject to selective reporting bias (notwithstanding findings from Bozzoli et al. (2011), using objective victimization data). Moreover, when controlling for observable individual characteristics in columns 1-2 of Table 8 , the relationship between optimism and self-reported victimization vanishes (declining in magnitude and statistical significance). This suggests misreporting could indeed differ across individuals differentiated by these characteristics. The positive effects of objective conflict on optimism, by contrast, are robust to the inclusion of controls in columns 1-2 of Table 9 . Table 6 are consistent with earlier findings. Our interpretation of these results, by contrast, is that less trusting individuals are more likely to self-report victimization. When we substitute the objective measure of conflict in Table 7 , the relationship is reversed. Again, controlling for observable individual characteristics leads to substantial declines in the magnitude of the point estimate for β 1 (this time, however, the same is true of β 2 estimated in Table 7 ).
In sum, regardless of the social behavior examined, results based on self-reported victimization are reversed when an objective measure of conflict exposure is used instead. Point estimates for the effects of subjective victimization generally decline in magnitude when controlling for individual characteristics, suggesting the latter may account for the bias in estimated effects. Of course, alternative interpretations of our results are possible, but our explanation is simple, intuitive, and grounded in established findings from psychology.
Robustness 6.1 Migration
While our objective measure for violence remedies the potential reporting bias associated with survey-based measures of victimization, it may suffer from measurement error due to migration. If a survey respondent or their family moved since WW2, then the prior incidence of conflict in their current PSU of residence would not reflect actual exposure to violence. Rather, in that case our objective measure would reflect the fact that the respondent and their family reside in, and are conditioned by, a war-affected locality. One might therefore consider the impact of conflict to manifest through two channels: the first being a personalized (family) experience with war, and the second being the broader institutional and social ramifications of war. To the extent that migration since WW2 is prevalent, then our estimated effects capture the impact of war as manifested at the locality level (i.e., the location-specific effects). It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether the effects of conflict on attitudes significantly differ according to the channel by which they are manifested. However, we attempt to address measurement concerns at least partially in several ways.
From the LiTS we can determine whether the respondent or their family moved since WW2. In case of either movement, our objective violence measure no longer captures personalized exposure for that individual. The extent of remaining locality-level effects reflected in that measure is determined by when the migration took place. In the extreme, if the respondent moved into the PSU in which they were surveyed one day before LiTS was administered, our objective measure would not capture locality-level effects for that individual.
If, on the other hand, migration took place immediately following the end of WW2, then that individual (with their family) would have been subjected to approximately 65 years of local conditioning. In that case, identifying off our objective measure would purely capture effects manifested through the broader institutional/social channels. Given that this measurement error is more pronounced for those having recently moved, for robustness we re-estimate our results excluding from our sample those ever having moved in their lifetime (but including in the sample those whose families were forced to move during World War II). Our results (unreported) remain qualitatively intact, although our estimates for the positive effects of violence on optimism are less precise (potentially due to sample size, which is approximately halved).
One outstanding concern in our main results is that migration (and therefore measurement error in the objective measure) is nonrandom with respect to (correlates of) the outcome. To address this, we control for individual and family migration (due to WW2). Our identification is based on variation within nonmigrants, and on variation within migrants,
and not based on migrant-nonmigrant comparisons. Still, our results could be biased towards zero if those most heavily affected (in terms of attitudes) by conflict are likely to displace themselves into areas not affected by conflict. This is a possibility we cannot rule out entirely, but we can assert that migration was limited under communism in our region of interest, both internally and externally (Janos 2000). Moreover, less than 20% of respondents had families forcibly relocated as a result of World War II. As such, the contamination of non-affected PSUs by conflict-affected migrants should not be so severe as to completely wash away an otherwise valid result linking objective victimization to attitudes.
Decomposition of indices
Our results demonstrate that the positive impact of self-reported victimization on political and civic engagement is essentially reversed once we substitute an objective measure of violence. Bust these results are partially based on indices we construct. One might therefore wonder whether these are general findings, or artefacts of the particular indices employed.
In the appendix we therefore present results for the individual components of the respective indices. Table A5 demonstrates that all forms of political engagement in the protest index are positively correlated with self-reported victimization. Table A6 shows that the positive correspondence between social capital and victimization is driven mainly by involvement with artistic, professional, environmental, and youth associations (with positive but insignificant effects in most other columns). Once we adopt the objective measure for conflict exposure in Table A7 , the positive correlation with each and every form of protest (from Table A5) vanishes. The analogous is true when comparing columns 3, 5, 6, and 8 between Tables A6   and A8 . Hence, our results are not a byproduct of index construction, and are quite robust across various submeasures of political and civic engagement.
Additional robustness checks
We first explore whether our results are driven by the different levels of aggregation of our subjective conflict measure (at the individual level) as compared to the objective measure (at the PSU level). In Tables A9 and A10 we aggregate the subjective measure to the PSU level, and rerun our full model for each outcome variable. Comparing Tables A9 and A10 with Tables 4 and 8 , respectively, we do not observe strong differences across results. In most cases, the sign of the effect is preserved, even if statistical significance is diminished. It is difficult to compare effect sizes across tables because the interpretation of the subjective victimization variable itself changes under aggregation. In Tables A9 and A10 , the selfreported measure of victimization captures average perceptions within a PSU. Since only 24% of variation in the self-reported measure is attributable to PSU-level characteristics, this average is a rough proxy for the underlying individual assessments. We do not theorize on whether average perceptions within a locality should influence social behaviors of the individual; this line of inquiry departs from our main purpose of demonstrating evidence of reporting bias at the individual level.
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In Tables A11 -A12 we replicate the results from the baseline specifications, but include simultaneously the objective and subjective determinants of victimization. Even though the sample size drops slightly, results are very similar to those when we include each conflict measure one at a time. The effects of subjective victimization are robust to including objective exposure, and this is consistent with our interpretation of the subjective measure reflecting personalized response bias.
Conclusion
We revisit the literature linking conflict victimization and social attitudes. In particular, we question the survey-based measures used widely in this line of inquiry and make use of a psychology literature which has demonstrated severe misreporting in retrospective accounts of adverse childhood experiences. Most importantly, the propensity to misreport has been linked to various individual characteristics, including attitudinal factors. Consequently, we argue that endogenous misreporting can explain, at least to some extent, the impact of conflict on civic and political engagement. We replicate earlier findings in a new setting, based on our own survey-based measure. But when we instead use an objective measure of victimization, based on historical reference material, the effects are reversed.
The same discrepancy between results generated from subjective and objective measures of conflict also holds when examining optimism and trust. Further, we find that conflict has a positive effect on optimism in the long run, which is counter to short-run findings. Last, we find little evidence supporting the commonly-held view that conflict exposure negatively affects trust. Our results thus warn researchers and policymakers to be more cautious in accepting 'stylized facts' relating conflict to social attitudes. Notes: OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the level of subnational regions are in parentheses. Controls for PSU latitude and longitude, urbanity, age, age squared and marital status are included but not shown. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Notes: OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the level of subnational regions are in parentheses. Controls for PSU latitude and longitude, urbanity, age, age squared and marital status are included but not shown. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
